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Book Reviews
CASES ON THE LAW OF CARRIERS
By Ralph Stanley Bauer and Edgar Watkins, New York, Pren-
tice-Hall, Inc., 1928.
Teaching the law of carriers has, in recent years, been a diffi-
cult task. The difficulty has been due, in part, to the lack of text
books or case books which were suitable for the purpose of instruc-
tion. This has been in turn due to the fact that in many schools
the laws of carriers is not taught as a separate subject and to the
rapid development and change in the law of carriers.
The present book has been prepared with the idea (1) that the
law of carriers should be taught separately and not in connection
with the law of distinct and unrelated public services; and (2) that
the present and not the former law of carriers should be taught.
The book was evidently designed to present materials from which
the present law of carriers may be learned, and was not prepared for
the purpose of furthering some pet theories of its editors. It does
not, as do some case books, present the law of carriers as it existed
prior to the enactment of the Interstate Commerce Act and its'
amendments and of similar state legislation, and then state briefly in
footnotes that statutes have changed the law. It sets forth materials
from which the present, living law of carriers may be learned. The
book contains 537 cases. Many of these are very recent cases and
many are decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, the
tribunal in whose hands the ultimate vesting of the law of carriers in
a large measure lies. Parts of important federal statutes are inserted
in the text whenever needed to make the subject matter clearer, and
in addition, the Federal Bill of Lading Act, the Uniform Bill of
Lading Act, and a large portion of the Interstate Commerce Act are
included in an appendix.
The table of cases, which includes not only the cases'reported
in the book but also the cases cited either in the text of the cases
or in the footnotes, adds greatly to the value of the book. The
typographical features of the book are excellent.
The editors state that "so large a portion of the law of carriers
is now directly or indirectly affected by statutes that the presentation
of an almost strictly common-law treatment of the subject, such as
many books have hitherto contained, seems obsolete," and they "have
endeavored to present such cases as give the student an accurate
idea of the original common law, the common law as modified by
statutes, and the effect of the most important statutes governing the
subject". Their purpose is praiseworthy and admirably executed.
"Much of the subject matter has already stood the test of presenta-
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tion in classes, with apparently satisfactory results." We believe
that the book as a whole when subjected to such a test will be found
eminently satisfactory.
W. H. Hitchler
MARRIAGE LAWS AND DECISIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
By Geoffrey May. New York, Russell Sage Foundation, 1929.
pp. 477.
This book is a digest or summary of the provisions for regulat-
ing the creation of the contract of marriage in the forty-eight states
and the District of Columbia. It includes, besides the statutes in
regard to marriage, over 2,000 court decisions interpreting those laws
or expressing the common law in relation to the marriage contract.
The author has limited his work to compilation and has refrained
from appreciative or critical comment. There is an introduction, in-
telligible to layment, containing a definition of the common law and
its relation to statute law, and a brief outline of the common law
relating to the creation of the marriage contract.
The book cannot be called an exhaustive treatise, but is a quick
reference to compiled information. To insure ease of reference and
simplicity in comparing the law on the subject in the various states,
an outline form of treatment is given, identical for each state, under
which the laws and decisions of each are classified.
For those who wish a general knowledge of the subject, or who
still need to be convinced of the lack of uniformity among the various
states, the book is valuable. Practitioners will find it a useful
medium through which to reach the primary authorities.
The author must be given full credit and complimented for the
vast amount of labor and research involved in the production of the
book. As might be expected in a work of this somewhat ambitious
magnitude, more or less serious errors have crept in. Instances of
these mistakes are found in the section devoted to the statement of
the law in Pennsylvania, with which the writer of this review is
most familiar.
On page 361, the author states that insanity is ground far
divorce in Pennsylvania. This impression was probably gained from
the ambiguous and controversial Act of April 18, 1905, P. L. 211,
the first provision of which is: "In cases where the husband or wife
is a hopeless lunatic or non compos mentis, the Courts of Common
Pleas of this Commonwealth are invested with the authority to re-
ceive a petition or libel for divorce, etc." Many trial courts con-
strued this statute as providing a new ground for divorce. Finally
in Baughman v. Baughman, 34 Pa. Super. Ct. 271, (1907), it was
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decided that this Act related to procedure only and did not create a
new ground for divorce; in other words, that the Act provided that
divorce could be granted upon existing grounds in spite of insanity
and did not provide for the granting of divorce because of insanity.
This construction of the statute was reiterated in Mintz v. Mintz, 83
Pa. Super. Ct. 85, (1924).
Because of the decision in Baughman v. Baughman, the legisla-
ture passed the Act of May 3, 1909, P. L. 390, validating all divorces
theretofore erroneously granted under the Act of 1905. A similar
validating statute was enacted by the Act of May 13, 1927, P. L. 991.
On page 366, the author correctly states that the marriage of a
person having a spouse living at the time is absolutely void and may
be so decreed upon action of the innocent or injured party, and that
the nullity is absolute regardless of the length of absence of the
former spouse so long as the prior marriage was actually subsisting
at the time of the subsequent marriage. Strangely, on page 367, the
author then states that- if the former spouse has been absent for
seven years the presumption of death arises and allows the absentee's
spouse validly to contract another marriage. For this proposition
three cases are cited: O'Keefe v. O'Keefe, 15 C. C. 88; Miller v.
Jacobs, 18 Monty. L. R. 185; Wilhelm's Estate, 23 Dist. 757. In none
of these cases was the validity of such a second marriage raised. In
the first case the libellant sued the respondent for divorce under the
Act of April 14, 1859 on the ground that the respondent had a spouse
living at the time of her marriage to the libellant. The question was
whether or not the libellant was such an innocent and injured party
as could sue for a divorce under the Act of 1859. At the time of
his marriage to the respondent the former knew of the latter's pre-
vious marriage but the latter's spouse had been absent for more than
seven years and it was held therefore, that at the time of his mar-
riage to the respondent, the libellant was an innocent and injured
party.
In the second case the plaintiff sued the defendant for breach
of promise. It was held that the former marriage of the plaintiff
to the person unheard of for more than seven years did not prevent
the validity of the defendant's promise to marry.
In the last case the testator devised property to his son for life
and upon the death of the son the remainder to his widow. After
the testator's death the son married a woman who had formerly been
married but whose former spouse had been unheard of for thirteen
years. Subsequently the son -died and it was held that until the
presumption of the death of the widow's former husband was over-
come that she was entitled to the remainder as devised in the wilL
Two or three other similar inaccuracies were noted, discussion
of which is prohibited by lack of space.
Fred S, Reese
